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	In this paper I examine the uses of the context distinction in debates over the legitimacy of feminist epistemology as a field.​[2]​  The distinction between “the context of discovery” and “the context of justification” has undergone many changes since Reichenbach first introduced this terminology in 1938.  For some, the “context of discovery” refers to the psychological thought process of a scientist developing a hypothesis, and the “context of justification” refers to the rational reconstruction of the evidence for that hypothesis (Reichenbach 1938).  For example, German chemist Friedrich Kekulé envisioned the hypothesis that benzene molecules are ring-shaped when he dreamt of a snake biting its own tail.  The dream could be considered part of the context of discovery, and any empirical evidence that supported Kekulé’s hypothesis would be part of the context of justification.   
As we shall see, however, the meanings and uses of the context distinction have shifted.  Contemporary debates have turned to the normative relationships between political values and rationality or epistemic values.​[3]​  For example, Noretta Koertge uses the context distinction to object to a feminist epistemology approach to philosophy of science on the grounds such an approach violates the context distinction (Koertge 2003). Although Nelson and others have attempted to defend feminist epistemology against this type of charge (Nelson 1995a, Anderson 2004), I believe their responses have not fully captured Koertge’s objection.  I suggest that their conceptions of the context distinction differ in important respects from Koertge’s, which has lead to an under-appreciation of Koertge’s objection and an obscuring of the underlying issues at debate.  
Recently, many have turned away from the context distinction, contending that its usefulness has ended.  Although I do not disagree with this contention, I do warn that it is not so easy to turn away from a philosophical tool that has gotten so much traction in the past.  Adherence to some version of the distinctions remains in the minds of many who object to certain philosophical approaches incorporating scientific practice.  Teasing out the exact nature of the objections is helpful for addressing them.  Moreover, renewed interest in the distinction suggests that we will be hearing more about it once again (Schickore and Steinle 2006).  If this is so, then I contend we must proceed with caution.  My central thesis is that the context distinction separating discovery from justification has been used in debates about feminist epistemology and scientific practice as a surrogate for underlying disagreements about justification itself.  Ambiguous uses of the context distinction mask disagreements about what kind of thing scientific justification is (i.e., whether it is a stipulated definition) and how philosophers should determinate that (e.g., through a priori means versus through observation of instances of scientific justification).  To demonstrate this thesis, I show how Koertge’s objections to feminist epistemology are more substantial that they might first appear and can be better appreciated when thought of as a charge of making a category mistake. In the end, however, I conclude that one cannot object to a view by saying that it violates the context distinction, since at debate is whether such a violation is itself a problem.  
In this paper I will proceed as follows.  I begin by reviewing Koertge’s objection that feminist epistemology conflicts with the context distinction.  To motivate her objection, I frame it in terms of the example of Lysenko science (an example she mentions briefly but does not discuss in detail).  I then offer an analysis of the example before turning to Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s response to the objection.  Nelson is part of an effort of Quinean scholars, feminist scientists, and philosophers attempting to reform traditional philosophy of science.  Nelson, along with others, especially Richmond Campbell (1998) and (2003), argue that the “core tenets” of traditional philosophy of science, including the context distinction, should be central targets of this reform (Nelson & Nelson 2003).  So, Nelson maintains that while the distinction does conflict with her version of feminist epistemology, this is an asset rather than a problem.  I then return to Koertge’s original objection.  Equipped with a more complex understanding of the context distinction, we will now see that Koertge’s objection is more substantial than this response acknowledges.  Nonetheless, as I will show, Koertge’s argument ultimately does not block the feminist epistemology approach, although analysis of the argument leads us to fruitful questions.   In particular, uses of “the context of justification” in this debate reveal commitments not only about what constitutes justification of scientific claims, but also debates about who should help decide what constitutes justification, and how they should do it.  These are meta-questions about how we should do philosophy of science.  Ultimately, as I will show, the debate is about when philosophers should look to scientific practice, and for what. 
II. Koertge: The argument against feminist epistemologies
While many critics dismiss feminist epistemologies as tangential to the traditional focus of philosophy of science,​[4]​ notable exceptions include Susan Haack, Cassandra Pinnick, Robert Almeder, and Noretta Koertge.  These authors see the approaches of feminist epistemologists as direct challenges to important and hard-won traditional views on objectivity and bias.  Through anthologies such as Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology (2003) and A House Built on Sand (1998), these authors respond directly to the writings of feminist epistemologists such as Elizabeth Anderson and Lynn Hankinson Nelson.​[5]​
	Noretta Koertge presents a particularly forceful critique of feminist epistemology.  She tends to gather together the views of a variety of feminist epistemologists, and then argues against the approach of feminist epistemology as a whole on the grounds that this approach to science studies conflicts with core tenets of traditional philosophy of science (Koertge 1993, 1996, 2003a, 2003b).  Koertge contends that adhering to these core tenets is essential for protecting the integrity of scientific research and guarding against personal and political biases.   One of the core tenets Koertge discusses is the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification.  
Koertge’s conception of the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification” differ from Reichenbach’s and, as we shall see, from Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s conceptions.  Koertge describes the context of discovery as the point at which research questions are chosen and hypotheses are formulated; she describes the context of justification as the process of “pursuing a solution to a research problem” (Koertge 1993, 132) or the stage of research at which hypotheses are tested and evaluated (see Figure 1, Appendix).​[6]​  To understand Koertge’s use of the distinction, and what is at stake in discussions of the context distinction, I offer the example of Lysenkoism. 
Koertge and other critics of feminist epistemology frequently cite the example of Lysenkoism to demonstrate the dangers of violating the context distinction.  To reveal Koertge’s concerns, I will go into more detail than is typical in these debates, first reviewing the mythical version of the so-called “Lysenko affair,” and then later returning with a more nuanced interpretation of the case. A common story about Trofim Lysenko is that he was an under-educated Soviet farmer who allowed his Marxist idealism, rather than experimental evidence and scientific rigor, to rule his scientific theories.​[7]​  Lysenkoism consists of a practical component and a theoretical underpinning.  The practical component, which Lysenko dubbed “vernalization” (iarovizatsiia), is the claim that if one soaks and chills seeds, one can plant them at untraditional times to yield better harvests (Sheehan 1985, p. 220; Jarovsky 1970, p. 190-197).  This led Lysenko to argue for the theoretical component, namely that environmental factors, and not self-reproducing genes, are responsible for hereditary changes.  Promoted by Stalin, Lysenko’s vernalization was implemented on a large scale, but never yielded the promised bountiful harvests (despite claims to the contrary).   Although it had been previously known that one could affect seeds in various ways by soaking and chilling them, Lysenko’s further claim that this leads to larger harvests has never been substantiated.  In the end, the typical story goes, Lysenkoism was not only a failed scientific theory, but it was also dangerous.  Many people died as a result of lost crops in attempts to follow vernalization; and, more directly, scientists who challenged Lysenko were politically persecuted and sentenced to death.  The traditional lesson told along with this myth is that allowing idealism to influence one’s science is harmful to society
Using Koertge’s characterization of the context distinction, it would be part of the context of discovery if Lysenko developed a theory based on Marxism, and if he viewed consistency with Marxism to be a reason to support his theory.  Any experimental evidence in support of the theory would be part of the context of justification.  By allowing political views to count as evidence for a scientific claim, Lysenko failed to respect the context distinction.​[8]​  He allowed factors relevant only to the context of discovery to count as evidence in the context of justification.  Under Koertge’s characterization of the context distinction, this would be as if Kekulé cited his dream as evidence for the ring-shape of benzene.
So what does it mean to “respect” or “violate the context distinction”?  The Lysenko example can help one understand both what Koertge’s endorsement of the context distinction means and also why she sees the distinction as necessary. According to Koertge, historical, political, and personal factors might legitimately influence the context of discovery (where hypotheses are developed).  However, different factors should come into play in the context of justification (where hypotheses are tested and arguments are evaluated).  In endorsing the distinction, Koertge supports the normative idea that these factors should remain distinct; in particular, political and personal values should not influence questions of justification.  Discussing Reichenbach, Koertge writes, “The primary job of his distinction was to protect the context of justification from extraneous elements” and to “keep epistemology free of historical contingencies.” (Koertge 1993, 125-6, emphasis in original).  She continues,
It is rationally permissible to use a motley array of ideas, beliefs, prejudices, interests, and ideologies for heuristic purposes [when developing ideas] but illegitimate to let them enter into the context of justification or evaluation. (Koertge 1993, 126)

Elsewhere, Koertge endorses the context distinction in even stronger language: 
I have argued that there should be no compromise when it comes to the proposal that ideological factors be invited into the context of justification.  We should make every attempt to keep politics and religion out of the laboratory. (Koertge 2003b p. 229)

If we recall that for Koertge, the context of justification is the laboratory activity of testing hypotheses, we see that again Koertge argues that ideology and politics cannot be a legitimate part of the context of justification.   So to “violate the context distinction,” as I call it, is to allow certain factors from the context of discovery, such as ideology, to influence the context of justification.​[9]​  Thus, Koertge argues that we should not violate the context distinction.  
There are two possible interpretations of Koertge’s argument against violating the context distinction.   The first interpretation is that when ideology influences justification, it always and necessarily leads to science based on “wishful thinking.”  Wishing thinking occurs when one begins with the desired result and accepts only that evidence which supports it.  This is clearly problematic, since selective use of evidence may lead to accepting theories and claims that are empirically inadequate, and I think Koertge is correct when she writes, “No one wants … science devoid of empirical adequacy (remember Lysenko)” (Koertge 2003b, 229).  Objections to this stronger argument would rest on finding counterexamples, namely instances where ideological influences in the context of justification leads to empirically adequate theories.  Several such examples have been offered in the literature, in many cases based on the idea that such ideological influences are in fact unavoidable, though Koertge and others do not find them convincing (Harraway 1989, Keller 1985, Potter 2001, and Koertge 2003a, Soble 2003, etc.).  Below I offer an example from Nelson in which she argues that ideology can even be beneficial.
Under a second, more defensible, interpretation of Koertge’s argument, one would concede that ideological factors do not necessarily lead to empirical inadequacy, but would argue instead that they easily could.  Thus, the argument would continue, it is better to avoid the risk by excluding ideology altogether.  Objections to this argument rest on risk assessment; there might be situations in which the benefits of including ideology outweigh the risks.  The challenge would be to show that there are such benefits (for example, see Douglas 2000). 
The objections are not unfamiliar. What is at issue here is to see how thet engage with uses of the context distinction.  So far we have used the Lysenko example heuristically to understand what “violating the context distinction” means under Koertge’s view.  By examining the mythical account, we have arrived at a better understanding of Koertge’s worries and what is at stake.  We see now that the earlier case of Kekulé’s dream is not what concerns Koertge.  Kekulé did not cite his dream as evidence for his benzene hypothesis, but rather offered independent evidence.  Thus, he was adhering to the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification: he did not apply the a-rational factor used in developing his idea directly to the justification of it.  In contrast, according to our story above, Lysenko violated the context distinction: his political commitments served as the main evidence for his hypothesis and covered up the lack of experimental rigor; thus his continued support for the hypothesis was unjustified.  Koertge is concerned that violating the context distinction by allowing ideology into the context of justification is dangerous; it may lead to wishful thinking, empirically inadequate theories and false claims.  At best, we are led away from the truth; at worst people die (crops fail, people starve, dissenters are persecuted).  Ideology in the context of justification can be dangerous and we should avoid it.
	This is an interesting and important argument.  However, on second examination, Lysenkoism no longer seems the best example to make these points.  True, the theories and claims are empirically inadequate, and, true, the use of them was dangerous and should have been avoided.  However, the problem was not any violation of the context distinction; the problem was not that ideology obscured the lack of evidence (as we shall see, it did not).  Rather, the problem was that Lysenko made no attempt to get evidence whatsoever, regardless of his ideology.
	To see this, we need to make two corrections to the traditional story.  The first is that coherence with Marxism (specifically, dialectic materialism) was not a requirement for just Lysenko, but rather was a common requirement for Soviet biologist (Jarovsky 1970, 232-236; Graham 1993).  Marxism operated as a framework assumption from which many theories emerged and were judged.​[10]​  As a shared worldview, it was assumed by legitimate scientists as well, not just “cranks” like Lysenko and Michurin.​[11]​  For example, Aleksandr Oparin, the prominent biochemist who studied the origins of life and the “primordial soup,” incorporated Marxism into his later work.  In particular, Oparin built on the Marxist view that “the evolution of life passes through several ‘levels of being’ that were necessary for its origin;” he studied these levels (from “no life” to “microorganisms” to “complex organisms”), viewing them as sequential and non-repeatable (Graham1993, 110).​[12]​ This raises two problems for a Koertge style interpretation of the Lysenko affair.  First, the use of Marxist ideology as a framework assumption does not distinguish the empirically adequate sciences from the empirically inadequate sciences, so it cannot be used to explain the differences between them.​[13]​  Second, it is not clear that when ideology operates as a framework assumption it is still operating as evidence in the context of justification.  The Lysenko case leads to philosophically interesting questions: “How should we adjudicate between different assumptions, especially ones shared by an entire epistemic community?  Are some framework assumptions illegitimate, and how can we tell which ones?”  These are important questions, and, though related, they are not clearly the same as “Should some kinds of evidence be excluded from the context of justification?”   Thus we have moved away from connecting ideology with the context distinction.
	So the first correction of the Lysenko myth is that Marxist ideology was a framework assumption commonly shared by the scientific community; it was not evidence used by just Lysenko and other “cranks.”  The second correction builds on the first: Marxism was not Lysenko’s motivation for his scientific claims.  Historian David Jarovsky proposes that although Lysenko was partly motivated to be consistent with Marxist dialectic materialism, Lysenko was motivated as much, if not more, by the desire to produce immediate practical results.  Improving crop yield was a top priority of the Soviet government (Jarovsky 1970, p. 60, 91).  By promising results on the time scale of 3-5 years instead of the typical 10-15 years, Lysenko was able to create a name for himself.  Such promises were based on an explicit rejection of the lengthy verification processes that other scientists “foolishly” required.  For example, Lysenko is attributed with saying, "In order to obtain a certain result, you must want to obtain precisely that result .... I need only such people as will obtain the results I need." (Sheehen, 1985, p 223).  By itself, the practical orientation might not be problematic, but coupled with a disdain for gathering evidence in the traditional sense, we have a situation in which Lysenko is selectively choosing the evidence that will help him reach his goal.  
At first this might appear to be exactly what Koertge is concerned about. Wishful thinking leads to empirically inadequate and dangerous science.  However, according to my interpretation of Koertge, her charge is that ideology leads to wishful thinking, which leads to inadequate science.  Although ideology was a factor in the Lysenko case, it was not the mechanism by which the science was distorted.
Thus, from the perspective of some feminist epistemologists, both Kekulé and Lysenko represent extreme cases.  Kekulé’s dream is extreme for being so benign, whereas Lysenko’s science was particularly harmful.  Moreover, it is not clear that the problems with Lysenkoism come from his violation of the context distinction rather than from other features.  Although allowing ideological factors to inform justification might sometimes lead to lack of empirical rigor and empirical adequacy, it is not clear that they will always do so and they might even lead to benefits.
Now we have arrived at the connection between Koertge’s views on the context distinction and feminist epistemology.​[14]​  Feminists such as Nelson draw our attention to those cases where violating the context distinction does not lead to these problems, but instead enhances empirical rigor.  These tend to be the ambiguous middle cases, rather than the extremes.   For example, Nelson (1995b) discusses research on hormones in rats and cognitive abilities in humans.  As I will discuss in more detail below, assumptions about biological connections between gender and sex have influenced how both researchers and critics interpret the data.  Thus, Nelson rejects the claim that certain factors in the context of discovery should be irrelevant to the context of justification.
This is what Koertge objects to.  Koertge argues that feminist epistemologists mistakenly propose that ideology should indeed guide the context of justification.  She quotes Helen Longino as writing, “I am suggesting that a feminist scientific practice admits political considerations as relevant constraints on reasoning” (Longino 1990, 193) and “when faced with a conflict between these [political] commitments and a particular model of brain-behavior relationship we allow the political commitments to guide the choice” (Longino 1990, 191). 
To Koertge, this sounds entirely too close to the myth of Lysenkoism and to rejecting the context distinction: “The later remark hints that the [feminist] might also wish to interject politically progressive values into the context of justification [and not just into the context of discovery]” (Koertge 2003b, 227).​[15]​  Thus, Koertge concludes, since feminist views of science conflict with core traditional views of science, including the context distinction, feminist philosophy of science is wrong.  The argument from Koertge could be formalized in the following way:
Argument against Feminist Epistemology (FE):
1. FE conflicts with the context distinction.
2. The context distinction is a core tenet of philosophy of science.
3. Views that conflict with core tenets of philosophy of science should be 
    rejected.
C. Thus, we should reject FE.
Koertge is not alone in offering this objection to a feminist epistemology approach.  Haack, for example, argues that the ideas of feminist epistemology have failed to be properly engaged with.  She writes, “My colleagues in the epistemology mainstream mostly hope that, if they ignore it, feminist epistemology will go away” (Haack 1993, p.557).  She recognizes that feminist epistemologists engage with central philosophical questions and that more traditional philosophers should be responding to these challenges.  However, instead of seeing the feminists as making useful contributions to mainstream discussions, Haack finds their views to be problematic and potentially dangerous.  The feminist epistemology approach should be responded to and refuted, according to Haack, to prevent it from opening the door for biased and unwarranted scientific claims (Haack 1993, p. 564).  Feminist epistemologists wanting to respond to Haack, then, need to demonstrate that their views are not dangerous (i.e. do not promote “wishful thinking” and biased science) in the ways that critics like Haack contend.  Moreover, they need to show that their views are potentially useful and so are worth discussing in a more general setting.
III. Responses to the Argument
There are at least three possible reactions a feminist epistemologist could have to Koertge and Haack’s critique. One could argue that Premise 1 is false: feminist epistemology does not violate the context distinction and core tenets of philosophy of science; while it addresses central questions, feminist epistemology supplements, rather than challenges, traditional answers to those questions.  This response would endorse the context distinction by supporting the claim that there are factors in the context of discovery that should have no bearing on questions of justification.  Alternatively, one could accept Premise 1 and concede that feminist epistemology is a radical break from traditional philosophy of science.  One would then reject Premise 3; the context distinction is misleading, for example, because there is no clear-cut distinction between discovery and justification, so conflict with the distinction is no reason to reject feminist epistemology. A final strategy could be to agree with all of the premises, in particular with an endorsement of the context distinction and core tenets, and so agree to adjust one’s version of feminist epistemology to make it more compatible with those commitments.  I contend that Elizabeth Anderson employs this first strategy (1995a), and arguable Louise Antony (2002) follows the third strategy, though I will not be able to examine those accounts here. ​[16]​ As I will show below, Nelson employs the second strategies. 
Strategy 2 (Nelson): Feminist Epistemology is new and important
In several places, Lynn Hankinson Nelson (1990, 1994) maintains that feminist epistemology in general ought to be taken more seriously by mainstream philosophers of science and epistemologists.  Whereas other strategies minimize the differences between mainstream and feminist epistemologies, I suggest reading Nelson as taking the opposite position.  Nelson emphasizes the differences between the two general approaches with the aim of showing that many versions of feminist epistemology offer important new insights about how we know things (Nelson 1990, 1994).  
It is important to note that although Koertge’s charge is meant to apply to many different versions of feminist epistemology at once, the different versions are so diverse that it is not clear a single defense would suffice.  Thus, the rest of this paper will necessarily focus on Nelson’s own version of feminist epistemology.
Nelson embraces Koertge’s claim that the context distinction contradicts and precludes the feminist epistemology approach.  Nelson describes the distinction as that between “questions concerning evidence, justification and warrantablility” (context of justification) and “questions concerning the material, historical, and cultural circumstances of cognitive agents and their interests” (context of discovery) (Nelson1995a, 42).  In Nelson’s version of feminist epistemology, evaluating the justification of scientific claims requires taking into account the cultural and political circumstances in which those claims are made (Nelson 1995a, 42).  According to Nelson’s holism, if each claim is part of a complex web of beliefs, then no single claim can be evaluated in isolation.  Auxiliary assumptions, many of which are value claims, must also be considered.  
This was briefly illustrated above in the example on research into hormone levels and cognitive abilities.  Nelson explores critiques of this research in more detail, writing,
The evidence for these critiques, like that for the hypothesis with which we began, encompasses a broad body of experimental results, current hypotheses, and theory – elements of which, like the research feminists criticize, are substantively informed by sociopolitical context and values. (Nelson 1995 b, 414).

According to Nelson, both the original research and the critiques of it are embedded in correspondingly different systems of social values.  For the researchers, in Nelson’s view of the context distinction, the social values that contribute to the context of discovery (deciding which questions to pursue) are inextricably linked with the context of justification (determining what kind of data should count as evidence).  For feminists who critique the researches, their values are also integrated into the context of justification: their social values are grounded in challenges to traditional views about gender and sex, which will lead them to count different kinds of data as evidence.
Interestingly, Nelson does not claim that one group conducted “bad science” and the other “good science” (Nelson 1995b, 411, 414, 417).  Just as ideology can lead to both good and bad science (as we saw in the Lysenko example), Nelson contends that problematic or sexist ideology can even lead to good science.  So in this case the ideology which concerns Koertge is not a determining factor.  For example, one implication of the hormone example is that experimental evidence and empirical data may support a hypothesis when placed against one set of culturally embedded assumptions, and offer less support for the same hypothesis when placed against a different set of assumptions.  Nelson writes,
Judged against then current research questions and traditions, accepted theories and methods, and experimental results in endocrinology and empirical psychology, the hypothesis that testosterone causes right-hemisphere dominance enjoyed considerable evidential warrant… Considered in the light of the critiques advanced by feminist scientists, the assumption of a hormonal basis for sex-differentiated lateralization and the specific hypothesis we have considered are revealed to be substantially less warranted than when judged without benefit of these more exacting critiques. (Nelson 1995b, 417, emphasis in original)

Two groups with different assumptions can look at the same evidence, draw different conclusions, and both be doing “good science.” ​[17]​  Thus, Nelson views historical and political factors as relevant to whether a claim is warranted.  Since no one can escape having a sociopolitical perspective, issues within the “context of discovery” are relevant to the “context of justification.”  This means that Nelson endorses a violation of the context distinction.
Moreover, according to Nelson, accepting the distinction would force one to conclude that feminist work falls outside of epistemology.  That is because endorsing the distinction in the way I have outlined above entails viewing the social contexts of knowers as outside of justification:
If we recognize such a distinction and assume that epistemology is concerned only with questions of the first group [justification], then arguably feminist analyses that raise questions of the second group [discovery] are outside the domain of epistemology.  The question I am raising is whether feminists should grant this distinction.  (Nelson 1995a, 42) 

Thus, Nelson endorses Koertge’s Premise 1 that feminist epistemology is in conflict with one of the core tenets of traditional epistemology and philosophy of science.  Instead, Nelson argues against Premise 3: Views that conflict with the core tenets of philosophy of science should be rejected. Since Nelson contends that feminist work falls clearly within epistemology, she must find a way to reject the tenet of the context distinction.  Nelson argues that to use the context distinction to exclude social circumstances from accounts of justification is to beg the question against the feminist epistemologists.
A naturalistic philosophy of science must allow the details of individual episodes to indicate, what, if any, such factors were of import, in what ways, and to what degree – not adopt methodological principles that prejudge this issue. (Nelson 1995b, 409)





IV. Possible objection: violating the context distinction commits a category mistake

This charge of begging the question is at the heart of Nelson’s defense of feminist epistemology and at the crux of our rhetorical analysis of the context distinction.  How could a critic like Koertge respond to this charge?  We get a clue from Nelson, who writes,
Some scientists and philosophers have known there is a conversation about “gender and science” going on, but their views about science, and specifically their understanding of empiricist tenets and of current empiricist accounts of science, have led them to think there is something akin to a category mistake at work. (Nelson 1990, 4)

Although Nelson quickly moves on to other reasons many feminist epistemologies have been marginalized, I think that talking about a category mistake is exactly the right way to think about Koertge’s use of the context distinction.  If Nelson had indeed made a category mistake in allowing factors of the context of discovery to affect the context of justification, then Koertge’s argument against Nelson would not be begging the question after all, since Koertge would have an independent reason to support the context distinction.  On the other hand, if Nelson does not make a category mistake, then Koertge’s argument loses force.
There are two ways of describing category mistakes (Meiland 2001).  Under one description, the arguer conceptually places the entity in one category when it actually, and necessarily, belongs in another category.  Gilbert Ryle offers the example of team spirit:  a person observing cricket for the first time will learn that players in different positions (the bowler, the batsmen, the fielders, etc.) perform different tasks (Ryle 1949).  The novice then might ask who performs the task of exhibiting team spirit.  This question would be based on a misunderstanding of the game.  Exhibiting team spirit is not a task assigned to one position.  Rather, a player exhibits team spirit in the way he performs his task, e.g., with graciousness, or with attention to the skills and needs of fellow players.  Thus, the novice mistakenly places “team-spirit” in the category of being a position in a cricket team, when in fact it belongs in a different category, namely the manner in which one performs one’s task.
One could also describe category mistakes as mistake about properties, not just about categories.  It is a simple mistake to attribute a property to an entity that it contingently happens to not have.  In contrast, to make a category mistake is to attribute a property to an entity that it necessarily cannot have (Meiland 2001).  For example, arguments can be valid or invalid, but they cannot be true and false.  It is appropriate to refer to a person’s walk as swift or slow, but not to refer to it as “orange” or “yellow” (at least, not literally).  This is not because the walk is a different color (mauve, perhaps), but because ways of walking are actions, and actions do not have color except in a metaphorical sense.
Using distinctions to highlight mistakes is common in philosophical debates about confusing or abstract topics.  Amie Thomasson notes that Ryle, Russell and others have often used the idea of category mistake “as a way of exposing, avoiding, or dissolving various presumed philosophical mistakes, confusions, and paradoxes" (Thomasson 2008, sec. 2.1). Thus, Koertge’s use of the context distinction against feminist epistemology can be seen as part of a larger tradition of using distinction.  Although Koertge does not use the language of category mistakes, she does suggest that justification has certain properties that Lynn Hankinson Nelson is not recognizing.  Koertge writes,
It is tempting to throw social values into the grab bag of desiderata that guide all aspects of scientific decision making.  But to do so is to jeopardize seriously the very features of science that make it so valuable in the first place.  
We want scientific results that have withstood the highest levels of empirical criticism and theoretical scrutiny.  When political considerations limit the questions that can be raised, the hypotheses that can be tested, or the alternative explanations that can be brought forward, that area of inquiry ceases to have scientific value, regardless of whether the political motivations are good or bad.  Scientific norms are not negotiable, and scientific values are not fungible. (Koertge 2003b, 233, emphasis added)

Koertge claims that those who violate the context distinction are taken to have attributed properties (e.g., being able to legitimately influence judgments of justification) to things (e.g., non-cognitive values) that cannot have those properties.  The alleged mistake is to discuss the political aspects of legitimate scientific justification when legitimate scientific justification is precisely the kind of thing that could not have political aspects, and conversely political values are simply not the kind of thing that creates better scientific inquiry – such values can only detract from, obscure, and limit knowledge production.  Koertge worries that scientific results could be negatively “tainted with the ideological biases of [sexist] scientists” and she agrees with feminists that this is something we have to be on guard against.  She is then incredulous when faced with the apparent call to “inject more ideology into science” (Koertge 2003b, 225).​[18]​  To Koertge, this probably sounds as though feminists are inadvertently endorsing Lysenko-style science (Koertge 2003b, 226) in which a politically motivated government dictates which scientific results will be acceptable; and where wishful thinking, rather than empirical adequacy, guides which hypotheses we accept.​[19]​  
We can now return to a Koertge quote we saw earlier:

…it is rationally permissible to use a motley array of ideas, beliefs, prejudices, interests, and ideologies for heuristic purposes [when developing ideas] but illegitimate to let them enter into the context of justification or evaluation. (Koertge 1993, 126)

For Koertge, ideology, whether based in good or bad values, can only lead one astray from empirical adequacy.​[20]​  I suggest that for Koertge the reason this “motley array of ideas” is properly considered part of the context of discovery but not the context of justification is because it is not the kind of thing that can legitimately influence evaluations of scientific claims.  Just as asking “What position in cricket is responsible for team-spirit?” is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of team-spirit, so would allowing ideology into justification be based on a misunderstanding of what justification consists of.
Thus it might seem that we have uncovered the heart of the disagreement. Allegedly, Nelson commits a category mistake: ideological factors do not have the properties of enhancing justification; they can only detract from it.  Presumably no further debate is needed.  I contend that this is a significant objection, and that it has been obscured by ambiguities of the context distinction terminology, as well as by the more recent tendency in philosophy to turn away from discussions of the context distinction.  However, now that we have uncovered this objection, there remain two possible responses to it.
First, whether any given distinction correctly captures the nature of the categories is a matter of debate itself.  Speaking generally about the philosophical concept of category as well as about individual episodes of category mistakes, Thomasson reminds us that those who charge others of making category mistakes must offer reasons for deciding what belongs in which category.  Such authors, 
owe an account of the conditions under which we can legitimately claim that two entities, concepts, or terms are of different categories, so that we know when a category mistake is (and is not) being made. Otherwise, they would face the charge of arbitrariness or ad hocery in views about which categories there are or where category differences lie. Yet there is little more agreement about the proper criteria for distinguishing categories than there is about the categories themselves.  (Thomasson 2008, 2.2)

Given the difficulties of developing an account of the categories, it seems that distinctions such as the context distinction cannot stand in for arguments.  Distinctions can be useful heuristic devices when they point out inconsistencies with commonly shared beliefs.  However, when the legitimacy of a distinction is itself at debate, the distinction cannot serve as an independent reason.  If we do not agree about which entities can have certain properties, then pointing to an alleged category mistake will fail to be convincing.  In this case, there is disagreement over whether a thing (such as a political value) can have a certain property (such as the ability to enhance evidential warrant as well as detract from it), with the feminist epistemologists arguing that it can.  Thus, to dismiss feminist epistemology on the basis that it violates the context distinction is, as Nelson argues, begging the question.  Other arguments might be used against feminist epistemology, most notably that Nelson’s view is open to the charge of relativism,​[21]​ but that it violates the context distinction cannot be a reason to reject the feminist approach. 
	Second, while Koertge’s objection falls within a tradition of pointing to category mistakes to dissolve apparent puzzles, she nonetheless uses the distinction in a non-traditional way here.  Ryle uses categories to open up room for more possible arguments.  He demonstrates how the Cartesian approach assumes minds are analogous to material bodies and so minds must have corresponding (yet mysteriously non-material) structures and causal interactions (Ryle 2000, 18).  Once we recognize this assumption, we can explore alternatives to it without abandoning it outright.  In contrast, in arguments against feminist epistemology, employing the context distinction closes down conceptual space, curtailing the number and types of arguments in play.  One must offer more reasons to justify closing down possibilities than for opening them up, since closing down conceptual space asserts a final word on claims that are still being debated.  Ryle does not make any claims when suggesting that we explore alternatives to the Cartesian assumptions (the claims come later, when he tries to justify those alternatives).  In contrast, by rejecting inquiries into ideological influences on justification from the start, Koertge does make a claim about the nature of justification. Thus, this use of the context distinction is susceptible to the charge of begging the question in a way that Ryle’s use of distinctions is not; Koertge’s use of category mistakes really is an instance of begging the question after all.


V. Implications for philosophy of science

The context distinction is entangled with many issues, including bias, “wishful thinking” science, values, and application.  Debates about these issues are on-going within much of the feminist literature; here I have argued that the ambiguity of the context distinction obscures rather than reveals the connections between them.  In this section I will point to just a few of the possible questions that our discussion of the context distinction has brought to the forefront.   
The first questions, which I will discuss in more detail than the others, are about the nature of justification.  Is justification an a priori concept/stipulation? Or are the features of justification something that we discover while engaging in epistemic practices? Koertge’s use of the context distinction seems to be an extension of her Popperian commitment to universal accounts of justification.  In the Popperian approach, one develops a general account of standards of practice (e.g., Popper’s model of falsifiability) and then turns to historical episodes in science to see how well they satisfy those standards.   Nelson has noted this feature, and referred to such accounts of justification as “extra-scientific” or a priori. (Nelson 1995b, 401).  However, while it is true that in Popper’s account of justification, a normative methodology descends from the outside to evaluate any particular episode in science, the procedure he used to create his normative methodology was not entirely a priori.  Popper began by identifying both positive and negative exemplars of scientific methodology (e.g. Freud’s psycho-analysis and Einstein’s relativity) and then extracted from them features of justification.​[22]​ Thus we see that while Koertge’s Popperian approach has some elements of an extra-scientific, a priori account of justification, that account was itself derived in part from actual scientific practice.
Nelson incorporates scientific practice on a different level and in a different way from Popper and Koertge.  Rebecca Kukla puts it this way:
The best way for philosophers of science to understand how epistemic practices succeed or fail … is not to come up with a philosophical theory … and then measure practices against it, but rather to look at actual, concrete epistemic practices engaged in by natural beings at particular historical moments and extract an understanding of the normative ideals … that these practices strive to embody. (Kukla 2008, 289, emphasis added)

Such a philosopher of science would look to episodes of science to see justification practices in action.  Although to “extract … normative ideals” seems similar to Popper’s construction of falsificationism described above, in fact this approach stops short of constructing an “extra-scientific” normative methodology out of these ideals.  Rather, episodes of science are incorporated into evolving normativities.  According to Kukla, “Standards of accountability to reality emerge bottom-up out of the micropractices of epistemic labour, rather than controlling such micro-practices top-down” (Kukla 2008, 289).  Rather than developing one universal account of justification, such feminists argue that from different situations there might emerge changing accounts of justification and that these accounts cannot always be determined before hand.
Other questions revealed by our discussion of the context distinction include:  

	To what extent should philosophers look to actual scientific practice to inform our conception of justification?
	Are some framework assumptions better than others? If so, what principles can we use to determine which ones?
	Can ideology (as well as non-epistemic, non-cognitive, or political values) enhance justification, or only detract from it? If the later, on what principled basis do we distinguish between, say, epistemic and non-epistemic values?

These questions are not new – they have been at the heart of the debates in feminist epistemology and of many debates in philosophy of science.  Although these are intricately connected issues, I contend that they are distinct. It is worth debating them separately, rather than treating them all as the same issue.
VI. Conclusion

As we have seen, the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification has been used to object to an entire approach to doing philosophy of science.  Koertge, Haack and others have objected to the proposal that we allow “political ideology” to influence questions of evidence and warrant on the grounds that doing so violates the distinction between discovery and justification, and opens the door for science based on wishful thinking and empirical inadequacy.  
I argue that while this objection has not been fully appreciated, it nonetheless does not succeed.  First, by looking more carefully at Lysenkoism and examples of hormone studies, we see that, according to one type of feminist epistemology, ideology does not always distinguish empirically inadequate science from empirically adequate science, and indeed ideology can sometimes lead to greater empirical adequacy.  Thus we learn that violating the context distinction might be helpful after all, in which case it would not be grounds for rejecting (at least one type of) feminist epistemology.
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^1	 I would like to thank the participants of the 2009 Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice conference, as well as Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Arthur Fine, Alison Wylie, Andrea Woody, Stephen Gardiner, Ben Almassi, and Asia Ferrin.
^2	  Authors in the debate tend to use “philosophy of science” and “epistemology” interchangeably, although the context is usually within philosophy of science.  
^3	  See Helen Longino on constitutive and contextual values (1990, 4).
^4	  See especially Gross and Levitt (1994)
^5	  Also Helen Longino (1990), Sandra Harding (1986), Elizabeth Potter (2001), etc.
^6	  Although this phrasing might make it sound as though the context of discovery always precedes the context of justification, Koertge acknowledges that in practice the two processes are not necessarily “temporally disjoint”; scientists might be continuously generating, testing, and altering hypotheses (Koertge 1993, 126).
^7	  Marxist dialectic materialism emphasized that nature is made up of interrelated, ever changing processes (Sheehan 1985, 38); some see Lysenkoism as more consistent with dialectic materialism than rival views in which individual genes controlled heredity, since genes might be viewed as inappropriately “individualistic” and deterministic (Sheehan 1985, 224).  For an insightful critique of this view, see (Jarovsky 1970, Ch. 8).
^8	  The reader might notice here that I am interpreting Koertge as applying the distinction normatively to scientists.  In contrast, I read Reichenbach as applying the distinction only to philosophers studying scientists, not to scientists themselves.  
^9	  When put this way, we can see that an additional argument is needed to determine which factors to keep out of the context of justification.  Many have attempted to determine this, including (Longino 1990, Koertge 1996, Kuhn 1977).
^10	  For more on framework assumptions, see (Putnam 1962a) and (Putnam 1962b).  For a nice discussion of Putnam’s views, see (Mueller and Fine 2004).
^11	  Part of why Marxist ideology was able to be so versatile is that it was so vague. See (Jarovsky 1970, 234).
^12	  Graham distinguishes between “authentic” and “calcified” dialectic materialism (1993, 119-121).  I contend that ideology is problematic primarily when it is rigidly “calcified” and used by political entities to suppress and persecute those who work outside of a (narrow version) of the framework.  Thus, the problem lies with political oppression, not the ideology itself.
^13	  Graham makes this point himself, after receiving criticism for linking both eminent and disreputable scientists with Marxism (1998, 7 & 26).
^14	  As mentioned earlier, Koertge tends to treat all feminist epistemologies as the same.  There are, however, significant differences between views. For simplicity, I will consider objections and responses to features of Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s views.
^15	  Koertge is opposed to using ideology in the context of discovery, as well, if it will limit the kinds of questions scientists are allowed to pursue (Koertge 2003b p. 226, 227, 233), so it is not clear that she would find Anderson’s response (below) convincing.
^16	  Although an impressive work of reconciliation, I think Antony’s response ultimately fails to capture the full force of some of Anderson’s and Nelson’s worries.  For a critique of Antony, see especially (Campbell 1998).
^17	  To some readers, this move may appear to expose Nelson’s view to the charge of relativism, a charge that Anderson’s view can avoid.  Nelson emphatically wishes to reject relativism, and argues that her emphasis on empirical adequacy and reliability keeps her holism from becoming relativistic (Nelson 1990, 40 and 295). Unfortunately, I cannot survey those arguments here.  Suffice to say that this criticism of Nelson’s feminist epistemology is distinct from the criticism considered in this paper.
^18	  Elsewhere, Koertge labels this view the Hair of the Dog ‘Cure.’ “I have several objections to … the idea that the best cure for the ideological hangover is ‘the hair of the dog that bit you’” (Koertge 1993, 128).
^19	  Pinnick expresses similar worries, making reference to “politically motivated science, such as Shockley’s eugenic or Brigham’s and Grant’s aptitude- and intelligence-test design” (Pinnick 2003, 22).
^20	  Koertge offers a particularly vivid example of the dangers here: “The assessment of the probability that the O-ring on the Challenger will fail must be independent of how personally, politically or financially undesirable the result of that assessment will be” (Koertge 1995, 134).  I suspect that Nelson and Anderson would both agree that this kind of “wishful thinking” should be avoided.
^21	  See footnote 17.
^22	  Popper writes, “It was the summer of 1919 that I began to feel more and more dissatisfied with these three theories—the Marxist theory of history, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology; and I began to feel dubious about their claims to scientific status. My problem perhaps first took the simple form, ‘What is wrong with Marxism, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology? Why are they so different from physical theories, from Newton's theory, and especially from the theory of relativity?’” (Popper 1963, 34).
